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Resolution encouraging application of “Rooney Rule” to all hiring

Over at National Review Online, NACRP friends Roger Clegg and Hans von Spakovsky report on an ill-advised Senate resolution proposed by five Republicans and one Democrat:

S. Res. 511 “encourages corporate, academic, and social entities, regardless of size or field of operation” to adopt some version of the National Football League’s “Rooney Rule.” That rule, named after Daniel Rooney, the owner of the Pittsburgh Steelers, was implemented in 2003. It requires every NFL team with a coach or general-manager opening to interview at least one minority candidate.

The senate resolution also endorses a proposal by Black Entertainment Television founder Robert L. Johnson to broaden this rule by encouraging companies to interview a minimum of two minority candidates for managerial openings at the director level and above, and to interview two qualified minority businesses before approving a vendor contract.

Read the whole thing here.

 

Department of Education: Racial bean counters extraordinaire

Regular readers of this blog are well aware of the Department of Education’s penchant for racial bean counting. Today’s Federal Register includes a notice from the Department that continues the Department’s proud tradition. The notice is entitled “Application for New Awards; Center for the Study of Distance Education and Technological Advancement.” At first the notice seems like hundreds of other notices – “study and develop best practices for online education,” “collect data on outcomes,” and so on and so forth.

However, in Section III, “Eligibility requirements,” the notice suddenly becomes interesting. The first two prongs of the eligibility requirements are unremarkable. The third prong, though, requires that an eligible institution, “has minority student enrollment of not less than 15 percent.” The notice elaborates upon this requirement:

For purposes of this competition we are adopting the definition of “minority student” in 34 CFR 607.7 as a student who is Alaskan Native, American Indian, Asian-American, Black (African-American), Hispanic American, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander.

To qualify as an eligible IHE for purposes of this competition, an IHE must have a minority student enrollment of no less than 15 percent. To determine the applicant’s minority enrollment percentage, use the following guidelines.

To qualify as an eligible IHE for this program, a postsecondary institution’s enrollment of minority students must represent at least 15% of its total enrollment (including graduate and undergraduate, full-time and part-time students, based on the most recent academic year for which IPEDS data are available). The Department will screen the applications to verify an IHE’s minority enrollment eligibility based on the criterion.

In our increasingly racially diverse society, there may not be an institution of higher education anywhere that has minority student enrollment of less than 15 percent. That is not the point. This is a crude form of racial bean counting. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that racial classifications are constitutionally suspect and subject to strict scrutiny. Yet nowhere in the notice does the Department of Education proffer any reason why it is vital to the success of this program that an institution’s student body be no more than 85% white. Any institutions that accept federal money are already subject to federal nondiscrimination provisions, so it is unlikely that any institution whose student body is 85% white is discriminating on the basis of race. The Department does not claim that it is trying to stamp out overt discrimination.

Nor does the Department claim that these requirements are necessary to achieve diversity. I am skeptical of the diversity rationale in education, but this notice does not even make a half-hearted effort to offer the diversity rationale (or any rationale). Although there still would be no valid reason for requiring certain racial demographics in order for an institution to be eligible, there would at least be some symmetry if the rule required something like, “In the interests of diversity, a single ethnic group may account for no more than 85% of the student body.” But that is not what the notice says.

Therefore, it seems unlikely that any compelling reason for the race-based requirements can be offered, much less that the Department’s approach is narrowly tailored. Are black and Hispanic students innately any less able to engage in distance learning than are white students? Wouldn’t socioeconomic status have more of an impact, regardless of the person’s race?

Assume that there is an institution that would like to apply for this grant but that has a student body that is 90% white. Perhaps this is a small institution in rural Wyoming that primarily serves rural Wyoming residents. A grant to study effective distance learning strategies would likely be of great value to this institution and its students. Yet the Department of Education offers no option for institutions like our hypothetical Wyoming institution to demonstrate why they are the best applicant, even if the institution also had to demonstrate that the racial demographics of their student body are due to happenstance (i.e., almost all our students are from rural Wyoming, and 95% of people who live in rural Wyoming are white). Based on this notice, if your institution has the wrong racial composition, then you are out of luck.

This notice is blatantly racially discriminatory because one racial group – in this case, whites – is singled out for less-favorable treatment than every other racial group. It provides that at least 15% of the students must be a race other than white. One might think that this is intended to ensure that the grants go to racially diverse schools. But what of historically black colleges and universities? Even if their student enrollment is 95% black, they are still eligible for this grant. An institution located near a reservation that consequently has 87% Native American enrollment would also be eligible. Whites are the only racial group that disqualify an institution if there are too many of them in the student body.

Lastly, the Department is not accepting comments on this grant competition. People who object to racial classifications and any institutions that would want to apply for the grant but have the wrong demographic makeup do not even have the opportunity to express their objections.

The notice is available here.

Obama Administration Ignores Congress, Pursues Administrative Akaka Bill

As the country celebrates Memorial Day weekend and remembers those who died for our country, the Obama administration quietly issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) that will drive a wedge between neighbors. By way of background, Native Hawaiians are not a tribe, but a race. They are not eligible for tribal status under the Constitution. In 2000, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rice v. Cayetano cast doubt on the constitutionality of set-asides for Native Hawaiians because those set-asides confer a benefit on the basis of race. Ever since Rice v. Cayetano, Native Hawaiian activists have been trying to attain tribal recognition so they can preserve these preferences by recasting them as preferences on the basis of tribal status instead of race. In response to rice, the late Sen. Daniel Akaka proposed “the Akaka bill,” which would grant tribal status to people of Native Hawaiian blood despite the lack of an historical tribe and the unconstitutionality of such a measure.

Congress rejected the bill every time Sen. Akaka proposed it. As Commissioners Heriot and Kirsanow wrote in a 2010 Wall Street Journal op-ed, the bill would establish two systems of government for American citizens living side-by-side – one for people of Native Hawaiian descent, and another, less favorable regime for people who are not of Native Hawaiian descent.

Last year, rumors began to circulate that if Congress did not pass a version of the Akaka bill, the Obama administration would attempt an end-run around Congress and unilaterally confer tribal status upon the Native Hawaiians. This is exactly what yesterday’s ANPRM does. Conferring tribal status upon the Native Hawaiians would be unconstitutional if Congress did it. It is doubly unconstitutional, and lawless, for the Administration to confer tribal status upon Native Hawaiians on its own authority. It has no authority to confer tribal status upon Native Hawaiians, but hopes that doing this through the bureaucratic process will stymie the opposition and perhaps leave its action invulnerable to legal challenge.

Commissioners Heriot and Kirsanow, along with former Commissioners Gaziano and Thernstrom, sent a letter to the Administration last year warning against any attempt to confer tribal status upon Native Hawaiians. Read the entire letter here: Letter to President Obama Opposing Executive Order Implementing Akaka Bill (September 2013).

Kirsanow and Heriot on disparate impact

Commissioners Kirsanow and Heriot discussed the spread and constitutionality of disparate impact at the Federalist Society’s Executive Branch Review conference. Adam Liptak of the New York Times moderated, and Ted Shaw, a professor at Columbia Law School and a longtime leader of the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund, also appeared on the panel.

Watch the whole thing here.

A Lady or a Tiger?: Thoughts on Fisher v. University of Texas and the Future of Race Preferences in America

DOWNLOAD THE FULL PDF

There are not many dull moments in the debate about race preferences in university admissions. Nevertheless, the issuance of the recent Fisher v. University of Texas case has often been painted as one of them. “In with a bang, out with a fizzle” is the title of one account of Fisher,1 and “Fisher’s big news: No big news” is the headline of another.2 But perhaps this perennially hot debate has not cooled down after all, and Fisher is better understood as a cliffhanger—one akin to the ending of Frank Stockton’s 1882 “The Lady or the Tiger?,”3 which famously leaves the protagonist uncertain whether a beautiful woman or a starved tiger will emerge from behind the door he is about to open.

Fisher proceeds from the premise that Grutter v. Bollinger, the 2003 Supreme Court case that found the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions system of holistic review constitutional, was rightly decided.4 But the opinion calls for tight judicial scrutiny of the means used to achieve Grutter’s approved end of diversity on campus—scrutiny tighter than what the Fifth Circuit and perhaps most other well-informed observers previously understood Grutter to require. It remains to be seen how the Fifth Circuit will thread this particular needle on remand, and the case may well return to the Supreme Court because it is less than clear what exactly this heightened standard of Fisher scrutiny entails. Thus the cliffhanger. Supporters and opponents of race preferences doubtless have opposite views on which post-remand scenarios are best characterized as tigers and which as ladies. In this essay, I explain why the ultimate outcome of the Fisher litigation is more likely to look like a lady to the opponents of race preferences (and conversely a tiger to preference supporters), but that there are enough possible paths that the Fifth Circuit and eventually the Supreme Court could take to make Fisher’s legacy far from certain.

The Parade of Horribles Lives: Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary

“If you are tired of Court watchers who like to hedge their bets, you might appreciate this:  I predict a reversal in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary.  It seems unlikely that the Court granted certiorari in order to congratulate the Sixth Circuit on its keen legal insight.  But I can’t help wondering why Supreme Court intervention has been necessary.  How did the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, arrive at the profoundly counter-intuitive conclusion it did?  And what does it say about our legal culture that the 8-7 vote broke down precisely on party lines?1

The case concerns the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative (“MCRI”)—a voter initiative passed in 2006 by a wide margin.  Its core provision prohibits the state from “discriminat[ing] against, or grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.” In other words, it enshrines in the Michigan Constitution the principle that the state should not engage in (among other things) race discrimination.  For exactly that reason, the Sixth Circuit found it unconstitutional.”

Download PDF of the full article here:

20140106_HeriotSchuette(1)

Letter to Congress Regarding Women and Minorities in STEM Booster Act

Download PDF: Letter Regarding STEM Booster Act

In September 2012, Commissioners Heriot, Kirsanow, and Gaziano wrote to Senators Harkin, Enzi, and Landrieu to express their opposition to the STEM Booster Act. The commissioners expressed their concern that the STEM Booster Act would encourage colleges and universities to engage in racial and gender preferences. Scholarly research has shown that these preferences often harm the intended beneficiaries, thus resulting in fewer STEM graduates. Thus, programs like those included in the STEM Booster ACT are often counterproductive.

Brief of Amici Curiae Gail Heriot, Peter Kirsanow and Todd Gaziano, Fisher v. Texas (merits stage)

“In this case, the Fifth Circuit has given the concept of ‘critical mass’ an expansive reading –one that is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Grutter and with the Equal Protection Clause. Even if it could be said that Grutter left ambiguous the  meaning of ‘critical mass,’ it is an important question of Constitutional law that should be settled by this Court and not various lower courts. The evidence discussed in this brief underlines tat question’s crucial importance. If Grutter is allowed to expand, the results will be unfortunate for the very persons whom affirmative action was designed to benefit.”

 

Download the full brief here: FisherMerits

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